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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 15-2774 
___________ 
 
JOSEPH E. CARLIN, 
    Appellant 
v. 
 
JEFFREY BEZOS; AMAZON.COM, INC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-14-cv-02406) 
District Judge:  Honorable Legrome D. Davis 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 18, 2016 
 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 23, 2016) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Joseph Carlin appeals the District Court’s order granting 
summary judgment to the defendants and denying his cross-motion for summary 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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judgment.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise a plenary standard 
of review.  See State Auto Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pro Design, P.C., 566 F.3d 86, 89 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 Carlin is the author of four self-published books, Muraldelphia: Black and White 
Edition; Muraldelphia: Full Color Edition; Repeal Roe . . . I tried; and Real Estate Sales 
and Listing Training Manual.  In 2011, Carlin signed up to use CreateSpace, a subsidiary 
of Amazon.com, and agreed to the terms of CreateSpace’s service agreement.  Through 
this agreement, Carlin granted CreateSpace a nonexclusive license to publish, distribute, 
and sell his books through Amazon.com and “other sales channels,” D.C. dkt. #34-5 at ¶ 
6.1, and CreateSpace agreed to pay Carlin royalties for the sales.  Carlin also enrolled his 
books in Amazon.com’s “expanded distribution” program, which allowed retailers 
outside Amazon.com’s umbrella to sell the books.   
 In 2014, Carlin filed the complaint at issue here, naming as defendants 
Amazon.com and its founder and CEO, Jeffrey Bezos (collectively, “Amazon”).  Carlin 
raised a single count of copyright infringement.  Carlin alleged that, while Amazon had 
paid some royalties to him, it had not paid him nearly the amount he was due.  He 
requested damages of $100 million.  After conducting discovery, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  The District Court granted Amazon’s motion and 
denied Carlin’s, concluding that any rational trier of fact would reject Carlin’s claim that 
Amazon had withheld royalties.  Carlin filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court.  
Amazon has filed a motion to file a supplemental appendix.   
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 We agree in full with the District Court’s analysis of this case.  To make out a 
valid claim of copyright infringement, a plaintiff must establish “(1) ownership of a valid 
copyright; and (2) unauthorized copying of original elements of the plaintiff’s work.”  
Dun & Bradstreet Software Servs., Inc. v. Grace Consulting, Inc., 307 F.3d 197, 206 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  In this case, it is undisputed that Carlin granted Amazon a nonexclusive 
license to his books.  A copyright owner who grants a license to use his copyrighted 
material typically can maintain a claim of copyright infringement only by showing that 
the “licensee’s use goes beyond the scope of the nonexclusive license.”  MacLean 
Assocs., Inc. v. Wm. M. Mercer-Meidinger-Hansen, Inc., 952 F.2d 769, 779 (3d Cir. 
1991); see also I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996).  As noted above, 
Carlin contends that Amazon exceeded its license by selling his books — either directly 
or through third-party distributors — without paying royalties.  We will assume that a 
licensee’s failure to make required payments constitutes copyright infringement.  See 
MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 941 n.4 (9th Cir. 2010).1 
 We agree with the District Court that a reasonable jury could not find that Amazon 
exceeded the scope of its license.  In support of his contention that Amazon sold copies 
                                              
1 Carlin objects to the fact that the District Court “turn[ed] this case into an ‘unpaid 
royalty squabble,’” Br. at 5, but in his briefs on appeal, he has not identified any other 
way in which Amazon has (purportedly) acted beyond the scope of its license.  We will 
address only arguments that Carlin has raised in his briefs.  See United States v. Pelullo, 
399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues 
not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned[.]” (internal citation 
omitted)).  Likewise, because Carlin has not challenged the District Court’s various 
interlocutory orders, we will not review those orders.   
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of his books without paying him royalties, Carlin presented screenshots listing a number 
of copies of his books that were “offer[ed].”  For instance, one Amazon.com listing for 
Muradelphia states: “Paperback.  $62.88 used & new (8 offers).”  D.C. dkt. #23 at 5.  
Carlin argued that each copy offered represented a copy sold, and thus demanded 
royalties commensurate to the number of copies that Amazon and its distributors offered.   
 However, Amazon presented evidence that Carlin’s screenshots illustrated only 
offers to sell the books, not consummated sales; to complete a sale, Amazon explained, a 
consumer would have to accept that offer.2  This interpretation of the word “offer” is 
consistent with both Washington state law (the law that governs the services agreement), 
see Yakima Cty. (W. Valley) Fire Prot. Dist. No. 12 v. City of Yakima, 858 P.2d 245, 
255 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993); Pac. Cascade Corp. v. Nimmer, 608 P.2d 266, 268 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1980), and the way in which that word is widely used, see, e.g., Fletcher-Harlee 
Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 250-51 (3d Cir. 2007); United 
States v. Vizcarrondo-Casanova, 763 F.3d 89, 103 (1st Cir. 2014).  In these 
circumstances, Carlin’s screenshots listing “offers” for his books do not provide a 
sufficient evidentiary basis for a trier of fact to find that Amazon and third-party 
distributors have sold additional copies of his books without paying him.  See generally 
Kaucher v. Cty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006).   
                                              
2 Amazon also provided evidence that it had sold 16 copies of Carlin’s various books and 
had paid him the appropriate royalties for those sales.   
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 Beyond his screenshots, Carlin has presented only speculation that Amazon has 
acted improperly.  As the District Court concluded, this does not suffice to survive 
summary judgment.  See Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014) (“an 
inference based upon a speculation or conjecture does not create a material factual 
dispute sufficient to defeat summary judgment.”  (quoting Robertson v. Allied Signal, 
Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 382 n.12 (3d Cir. 1990)); see also Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt, 
455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006) (“In this respect, summary judgment is essentially ‘put 
up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must rebut the 
motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made in the pleadings, 
legal memoranda, or oral argument.”).  
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.  Amazon’s motion to 
file a supplemental appendix is granted and the supplemental appendix is deemed filed on 
March 16, 2016.  To the extent that Carlin’s response in opposition to Amazon’s motion 
to file a supplemental appendix requests affirmative relief, the motion is denied.  
